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Abstract 
There is little empirical evidence concerning the effects of intellectual property rights (IPR) 
on a technologically advanced developing country. Complete enumeration of the Mexican 
maize breeding industry showed that, contrary to the hypothesis that IPR would provide, in a 
technologically advanced developing country, incentives for R&D and innovation, IPR play 
no role for the industry in general, but that they are important for certain breeders’ categories. 
The paper presents the theory on IPR and a short background on the Mexican maize breeding 
industry. The analysis of the interviews with maize breeders leads to the conclusion that the 
theory on IPR should be revised and take into account the characteristics of developing 
countries critical for the good functioning of IPR, especially the quality of the institutional 
environment and the judiciary system, and the importance of transaction costs related to IPR 
protection. The level of technological development also determines the extent to which actors 
can benefit from IPR protection. Given the relatively good score of Mexico on these two 
critical factors, IPR are likely to play an even smaller role for other developing countries.  
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1 Introduction 
Intellectual property rights (IPR) are generally considered an efficient institution to stimulate 
innovation. Strong IPR should provide incentives for innovation and expand investment and 
technology flows to developing countries (Maskus 2000). Although granting monopoly rights 
on an invention would impede its dissemination, under-provision of protected goods and mo-
nopoly distortions are usually considered acceptable costs in order to promote the creation of 
new knowledge and the increase in societal welfare that it brings (Gaisford et al. 2001).  
Growing numbers question this position and maintain that IPR do not play an important 
role in stimulating innovation in developing countries (CIPR 2002) and that the strengthening 
of IPR benefits industrialized countries while hurting developing countries (Panagariya 1999). 
There is considerable uncertainty on the effects of strong IPR in developing countries (Tansey 
2004). 
This paper examines the impacts of IPR on a technologically advanced developing coun-
try, Mexico, to determine their role for the different stakeholders of the maize breeding indus-
try. Little empirical evidence exists on this subject and the conclusions are often uncertain.  
Mexico was one of the first developing countries to effectively strengthen its intellectual 
property (IP) legislation: In order to comply with the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), Mexico enacted a new law in 1991. Its maize breeding industry is well developed 
and maize is subject to different types of IP protection: IPR are likely to play a role in this 
industry. As IPR are meant to support research and development (R&D), firms and public 
institutes involved in breeding should be the first actors to perceive their impacts. Interviews 
with maize breeders were carried out to gather information concerning the impacts of stronger 
IPR, complemented with interviews with representatives of IP regulatory agencies. 
Complete enumeration of the industry1 showed that IPR are not important for breeders in 
general, but that they are important for certain breeders’ categories. Even though they exist on 
a formal level, IPR are in most cases ignored by breeders in their day-to-day activities. There-
fore, IPR do not provide incentives for R&D and do not affect the concentration of the indus-
try nor seed prices, while the lack of data does not allow determining the effects on the diffu-
sion of germplasm, new varieties and inventions. The analysis indicates that the quality of the 
                   
1 
 I surveyed all companies and public institutions performing maize breeding except for two. One breeder, in a 
remote region, did not send the questionnaire back, and one company did not have a breeder at the time of the 
survey. 
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institutional environment and the confidence in the judiciary system, the importance of trans-
action costs related to obtaining and securing protection, as well as the level of technological 
development of the country are important factors affecting IPR’s use and perceived effi-
ciency. These factors should be considered when predicting the impacts of IPR on developing 
countries.  
The paper is divided into seven sections. The next section reviews IPR and their expected 
impacts, followed in section 3 by background information on the Mexican maize breeding 
industry. The fourth section presents the methodology used, followed in section 5 by the pres-
entation of the data gathered through the interviews. Finally, section 6 discusses the findings 
and derives implications for the relevance of IPR implementation in developing countries and 
section 7 concludes.  
2 Intellectual Property Rights and their Impacts 
2.1 Knowledge as a Public Good 
Knowledge is a public good, non-rival in consumption and non-price excludable. From eco-
nomic theory, such goods will not be provided at an optimal, socially desirable level. A com-
mon intervention2, to correct for this undersupply, consists in the definition of property rights 
that will allow private investors to harvest the profits generated by their effort rather than 
share those with free-riders. These property rights will provide incentives to achieve a greater 
internalisation of externalities (Demsetz 1967), ensuring that the benefits from the innovation 
are concentrated with the innovator, to provide incentives for further innovation. However, 
with any property rights structure transaction costs are positive, which implies that rights are 
never perfectly specified and enforced (North 1990), also affecting the extent to which exter-
nalities are internalised. The specific costs related to the breeders’ transactions are discussed 
in the following section. 
Still, the new knowledge produced by agricultural R&D is not always a pure public good: 
know-how related to breeding techniques is non-rival, while the seed produced is. Similarly, a 
                   
2
   Other interventions may consist for example of the creation of new public and private sector R&D 
institutions, enhanced incentives for private involvement and the provision of public funds for publicly or 
privately executed R&D. 
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maize hybrid variety3 – i.e., that does not breed true - is excludable, while an open pollinated 
variety is not.  
Figure 1 illustrates the roles and impacts or IPR in the research and seed industry research 
and production process. With IPR arises the dilemma of “access versus appropriability” 
(Alston, Norton and Pardey 1995). By granting temporary exclusive rights on inventions, IPR 
are intended to allow right-holders to price their products above marginal cost, and hence re-
coup their initial research investment. Such exclusive rights create incentives for the perform-
ance of R&D leading to innovation, while impeding the dissemination of new technologies 
and innovations. However, inventors have to disclose the details of their inventions in order to 
obtain protection. Finally, IPR tend to support the concentration of the industry but some in-
novations can also have deconcentrating effects (Lesser 1998). The theory does not offer clear 
indications as to which effect dominates: it is clearly an empirical question.  
 
Labour 
Capital
Human Capital
Genetic 
resources
R&D New seed 
varieties
Farmers
Incentives Diffusion Market structure, Prices
 
Figure 1:  IPR in the Seed Industry Research and Production Process 
Source: Adapted from Léger (2001) 
Based on this framework, we can hypothesize the following impacts of IPR on the maize 
breeding industry: 
1. IPR provide incentives for private R&D and innovation; 
2. IPR restrict breeders’ access to protected germplasm and inventions; 
3. IPR foster the concentration of the industry and an increase in seed prices. 
                   
3 
 A hybrid is the product of two inbred parental lines and is characterized by “hybrid vigour”, i.e., superior 
yields. Yet these yields are not transferred to the subsequent generation, which implies that the farmer needs 
to buy new seed each year, creating a biological form of intellectual property protection. Only the holder of 
the parental lines can produce a certain hybrid, thus most companies protect these with Trade Secrets. 
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2.2 Strengthening of Intellectual Property Rights  
Historically, national patent systems were developed to support domestic industrial develop-
ment. However, the increase in international trade, and the advent of new, information-based 
products and services, led multinational companies to request international policies that would 
help protect their proprietary information. The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) sets minimum standards for IP protection in WTO mem-
ber states.  
For the case of plant breeding, strengthening of IPR basically consisted of: i) Making pat-
ent protection available for all inventions in all fields of technology – plants and animals be-
ing exceptions; ii) Providing for the protection of plant varieties, for example using Plant 
Breeders’ Rights, a specialized type of protection for plant varieties granted by the Interna-
tional  Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV); iii) Allowing for the pro-
tection of undisclosed information (Trade Secrets); and iv) Ensuring the adequate enforce-
ment of the rights. The study focuses on three types of IPR relevant to innovation in maize 
breeding, namely Patents, Plant Breeders Rights (PBR) and Trade Secrets. Other types of IPR 
(e.g., trademarks, geographic indications) act as marketing tools rather than means to support 
technological advances (Perrin 1994) and will not be considered in the discussion. Definitions 
of rights and examples of uses for maize breeding are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: Intellectual Property Rights für Maize Breeding 
IPR Definition Example  
Patent Right to exclude others from imitating, manufacturing, using or sell-
ing a product or process for commercial use for a 20 years period. 
Genetic modifica-
tion introduced into 
a variety 
Plant Breeders’ 
Rights 
(UPOV 1978)a 
Right to exclude others from producing or commercialising material 
of a specific plant variety.  
Two exceptional uses of protected varieties are allowed:   
- Research exemption, under which third parties are free to use the 
protected materials to create new varieties or perform research; 
- Farmers’ Privilege allowing farmers to save and re-use the seed 
obtained from the cultivation of protected varieties. 
New maize variety  
 
Trade Secret Legally enforceable protection against unauthorized disclosure of 
proprietary information through commercially unfair means. 
Keeping secret the 
parental lines of a 
maize hybrid variety 
a) There are two versions of the UPOV Act: Mexico is a member of the Act of 1978, which encompasses more 
flexibility in terms of the Farmers’ Privilege and Research exemptions than the Act of 1991. 
Source: CIPR (2002) and Maskus (2000) 
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Whether the assumptions of IPR theory are justified for developing countries is however sub-
ject to debate (Jaffé and van Wijk 1995). Technological capacities differ widely among de-
veloping countries, which implies that not all of them are able to assimilate technologies from 
other countries, let alone develop their own technologies. The dynamic gains due to IP protec-
tion leading to indigenous innovation would hence not take place, and the static costs of IPR 
summed to the costs of implementation of the system would lead to a net negative effect for 
most developing countries. Given this trade-off, this paper analyses the impacts of IPR on a 
technologically advanced developing country, using the Mexican maize breeding industry as a 
case study.  
3 Maize in Mexico: Background 
3.1 Actors and Transactions 
The Mexican maize breeding industry is considered well-developed: research capacities are 
relatively high, breeding is performed by multinational and local companies as well as by the 
public sector, and breeders develop both hybrid and open pollinated varieties, which are sub-
ject to different types of IP protection. This industry is most likely to show changes following 
IPR strengthening. 
Figure 2 illustrates the roles and interactions between the different actors of the industry, 
following the germplasm flows, showing the segmentation of the market along the types of 
farmers and seed providers. Multinational companies (MNC) generally supply the commer-
cial farmers with hybrid varieties. They perform sophisticated breeding programs and possess 
their own multiplication and marketing facilities. National seed companies use germplasm 
from the public sector and universities to develop and commercialise their own varieties. 
Some cases of national companies selling MNC varieties under license have also been ob-
served.  
Small-scale farmers obtain modern varieties from small companies, cooperatives/ NGOs or 
the public sector, and their traditional materials are precious inputs in the R&D process of the 
breeding industry. Public research organizations comprise: i) INIFAP, the applied agricultural 
research institute, developing agricultural products; and ii) the universities, also under the 
auspices of the Ministry of agriculture, performing mainly basic research: new varieties are 
Intellectual Property Rigthts in Developing Countries 7 
 
only by-products of their activities. Lastly, CIMMYT4 is an important source of germplasm 
for the industry: its materials were used in 33.3% of the cultivars released by public organiza-
tions between 1966 and 1997, while 81.3% of varieties released by the private sector in 1997 
comprised such materials (Morris and López Pereira 1999).  
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Figure 2:  Structure of the Maize Breeding Industry and Germplasm Flows 
Source:  Adapted from López Pereira and Filipello (1995).  Note: Number of companies in each category in 
brackets 
Even though the Mexican maize breeding industry is generally perceived as well developed, 
the number of companies involved in breeding, and not only in multiplication and distribution 
of varieties, is still low. Only eleven companies would then be involved in maize breeding. 
They however present very different characteristics: products developed, resource endow-
ment, technological capacities, organizational structure, etc. These diverse actors’ groups are 
likely to identify different impacts IPR have on their activities and on the industry.  
IPR regulatory agencies consist of i) the National Service for Seed Inspection and Control 
(SNICS), an agency of the Ministry of Agriculture, responsible for the application of legal 
dispositions concerning seed and plant varieties, in charge of the verification and certification 
of the origin and quality of the seed as well as of the registration and enforcement of PBR; ii) 
                   
4  The International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre (CIMMYT from its Spanish acronym) is one of the 
International Agricultural Research Centres. It conducts maize and wheat research to benefit developing 
countries. 
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the Mexican Institute for Intellectual Property, the agency of the federal government respon-
sible for the protection of industrial property, i.e. registration of patents, examination of in-
fringement suits and promotion of IPR; and iii) the General Attorney of the Republic, in 
charge of the legal actions for infringements on trade secrets. 
3.2 Transaction Costs 
Breeders hence face mainly two types of transactions: with public research organizations and 
other firms, and with IPR regulatory agencies. Table 2 summarises the different types of 
transaction costs. 
Table 2: Types of Possible Transaction Costs 
 
Research Organizations and Other 
Firms IPR Regulatory Agencies 
Transaction between 
Breeders and… 
- Exchange of technologies and genetic 
materials  
- Growing/ multiplication contracts 
- Information on IP rules, procedures, 
policy 
- Examination and registration of rights 
- Enforcement of rights 
Ex Ante  
Information costs 
Negotiation costs 
 
Information costs  
Ex Post  
Implementation/ Refining costs 
Monitoring/ Enforcement costs 
 
Certification costs 
Monitoring/ Enforcement costs 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
Among firms and research organizations, contracts covering exchanges of materials and in-
formation are subject to information costs related to the identification of the suitable partner 
and product. Costs are also associated to the negotiation of the contract, for example the uses 
allowed under the agreement and the associated costs. The implementation costs relate to the 
completion of the transaction per se while monitoring concerns the respect of the agreed con-
tractual clauses and enforcement, the coercive measures taken in case of violation. 
The situation is somehow different for the transactions with IPR regulatory agencies. The 
information costs concern the knowledge needed to abide the laws and understand the proce-
dures, and negotiations are usually not needed. On the other hand, certification costs can be 
important and involve generating and compiling the information required for the registration 
of the rights, including the costs related to delays and uncertainty. Finally, monitoring relates 
to the identification of the illegal use of the protected variety or invention and enforcement, to 
the legal defence of these rights. As developing countries often face especially high transac-
tion costs (Collier 1998) they must be taken into account. 
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3.3 International Environment and Hypotheses 
The strengthening of IPR started in 1991, in anticipation of the NAFTA requirements, fol-
lowed in 1997 by a second wave of reforms, through which the country introduced plant vari-
ety protection and committed to ensure that enforcement procedures were available and effec-
tive. These changes brought Mexican laws in line with international IP standards, including 
the TRIPs agreement. The implementation of NAFTA triggered several changes, for example 
a domestic agrarian reform including a new seed law allowing the full participation of the 
private sector in the seed industry. Private sector activities were before closely monitored. 
Based on the institutional structure of the maize breeding industry, a fourth hypothesis can 
be added to the three developed following IP theory: 
1. IPR provide incentives for private R&D and innovation;  
2. IPR restrict breeders’ access to protected germplasm and inventions; 
3. IPR foster the concentration of the industry and an increase in seed prices; and 
4. IPR play different roles for different breeders’ groups. 
4 Data and Methods 
In the fall of 2000, interviews with a total of 25 breeders from 18 maize breeding companies 
and public institutes were conducted. The interviewees were identified from the lists of Mexi-
can seed companies provided by the Mexican seed industry association and the SNICS. In 
addition, data on IPR were collected to identify their patterns of use.  
All companies and public organizations performing maize breeding were surveyed except 
for two: one breeder in a remote area never responded and one company did not have a 
breeder at the time of the survey. Interviews with managers of the three IPR regulating agen-
cies were also conducted, to obtain data on IPR use, information related to registration and 
enforcement procedures and complement the information obtained from industry stake-
holders.  
The breeders interviewed were in general the main breeders of their company: the assump-
tion was that such breeders would have a better overview of R&D programs and would pos-
sess the knowledge required to answer all questions, especially those related to the orientation 
of research and budget changes over time. I conducted all the interviews personally except for 
two firms located in remote areas, to whom the questionnaires were sent by fax.  
10  Andréanne Léger 
The questionnaires used5 were designed to inquire about the effects of IPR on the seed in-
dustry research and development process, following the hypotheses, namely incentives for 
R&D, diffusion of knowledge and inventions, market structure and price effects. Given the 
relative novelty of the subject area in the industry and the lack of guidance of the theory, the 
questionnaires included several exploratory questions through which breeders could elaborate 
on their perceptions without being bound to a pre-defined set of answers. These questions 
allowed identifying preoccupying issues and clarifying certain positions. 
There are two main ways of quantifying the impacts of IPR on R&D and knowledge crea-
tion (Jaffé and van Wijk 1995):  
• R&D inputs, e.g., investments, number of research programs and human resources devoted 
to plant breeding; and 
• R&D outputs, e.g., number of new varieties developed and agricultural productivity. 
Although most respondents were very cooperative, they were in general highly reluctant to 
provide precise information on such aspects and gave, at best, indications on the direction of 
change in seed sales, number of breeders and R&D expenditures. For some organizations, the 
information was simply not available. I therefore used the information available on R&D in-
puts as indicators of the trends in the industry. Given the time needed to develop new varieties 
(average of 7 years) and the lack of data, indicators related to the R&D output were not con-
sidered.  
This study hence represents a complete enumeration of the Mexican maize breeding indus-
try. However, given the small number of observations a statistical analysis cannot be per-
formed and the results obtained reflect the opinions and perceptions of the interviewees at this 
point in time. 
5 Breeders’ Perception of Intellectual Property Rights: Results 
5.1 IPR Use in Mexico 
Because they perform different activities and serve different markets, the interviewees are 
separated into three actors’ groups: local companies, MNC, and public sector. Such grouping 
allows comparing their perceptions and investigating hypothesis 4, following which IPR 
                   
5 
 The questionnaires are comparable to those used in similar studies (Jaffé and van Wijik 1995; Butler and 
Marion 1983) and are available from the author upon request. 
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would play different roles for different actors’ groups. Table 3 presents some of their charac-
teristics. 
Table 3: Characteristics of the Actors’ Groups 
 
Type of varieties Other crops Alliances/ Foreign 
Partners 
Stated Use of IPR 
Private 
Local 
(11) 
 
Open Pollinated 
Varieties (OPV) 
sometimes hybrids 
 
Sorghum, wheat, 
red beans 
 
Not common (1) 
 
PBR: (3); Patents: (2) 
Trade Secrets: (3) 
MNC 
(4) 
Hybrids Sorghum, cotton Headquarters (4) PBR: (2); Patent: (1) 
Trade Secrets: (1) 
Public 
INIFAP 
Universi-
ties (4) 
 
 
OPV and hybrids 
OPV and hybrids 
 
 
All 
All 
 
 
Not common (0) 
Not common (1) 
 
 
PBR, Patent 
Nothing 
Note: numbers in parenthesis refer to the number of firms in each category, the number of alliances or foreign 
partners, and the number of companies stating to use this type of IPR for all crops, respectively.  
Source: Interviews  
The use of IPR reported by public and MNC breeders is consistent with the data obtained 
from official sources (SNICS, IMPI). Three local companies had applied for PBR, but none 
for maize varieties (see below), and 2 companies declared stated to own patents. This contra-
dicts the information gathered from IMPI, according to which none of the local companies 
possess patents on plants at the time of the study. The breeders might have confused using a 
patent under license and holding a patent.  
At the time of the research, the PBR system was not yet completely functional in Mexico: 
however applications had already been received by the SNICS. Most applications originated 
from Mexican companies (42%) while other applications came mainly from the US, France 
and the Netherlands (see figure 3). Maize and flowers represented the bulk of applications 
(56%), and three organizations had filed applications for maize: INIFAP (46.1%), Pioneer 
(32.5%) and Asgrow (21.4%), two MNC.  
It is a surprising outcome and contradicts hypothesis 1: IPR are meant to provide incen-
tives for private breeding and its main user is a public research institute. Moreover, the varie-
ties developed by the two MNC are hybrids, for which PBR protection is superfluous given 
their biological characteristics. The interviewees revealed that PBR protection of all new va-
rieties has been imposed by the high management/ headquarters of the company, irrelevant of 
the real need for protection. It was not clear if such policy was applied to all crops: If so, the 
importance of Mexican applications could reflect mainly INIFAP’s activities. These patterns 
12  Andréanne Léger 
of use support hypothesis 4, according to which IPR play different roles for diverse actors’ 
groups. 
 
Figure 3: Plant Breeders’ Rights Applications by Country of Origin and by Crop 
Source: SNICS (2000).   
For the case of patents, although the total number of applications in the country has increased 
over time, the number of applications filed by Mexican inventors actually decreased. Out of 
4,144 patent applications in the country in 1978, 787 (18,9%) originated from Mexican inven-
tors, whereas in 1999, the total number of applications had raised to 12 110 and Mexican ap-
plications were down to 447 (3,9%). Patent applications related to maize and maize breeding 
were likewise scarce in the country: In October 2000, only 5 such applications had been filed, 
all related to genetic engineering and originating from MNC involved in the life sciences in-
dustry. The information given by local companies on their use of patents contradicts the data 
obtained from the patent office, possibly indicating a confusion between using a patent under 
license and holding a patent. In this case also hypothesis 4 is supported by the patterns of use.  
Finally, from their nature trade secrets are not registered, data on their use are therefore not 
available. From the interviews, they seem to be mainly used in the private sector for establish-
ing contracts and alliances, but the concept is in general not very well understood.  
The level of knowledge concerning the types of IPR was generally low, but varied among 
breeders’ categories. MNC breeders were well aware of IPR, while local and some university 
breeders did not know much about it and needed basic background information about IPR to 
understand and answer the questions. This supports hypothesis 4 and reflects, on the one 
hand, the information costs prevailing in the industry and, on the other hand, the relative nov-
elty of these tools for the industry and their lack of relevance for the activities performed. In 
Mexico
42%
US
36%
France
10%
Netherlands
9%
Others
3%
Flowers
27%
Fruits
13%
Vegetables
9%
Others
21%
Asgrow
(25)
Pioneer
(38)
INIFAP
(54)
Maize
30%
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fact, the relative indifference and lack of knowledge of most actors supports the results found 
in other Latin American countries (Jaffé and van Wijk 1995) that IPR were not introduced 
following pressures from the industry, but rather to comply with trade agreements. 
5.2 Impacts of IPR: Breeders’ Perceptions 
Table 4 summarises the results from the interviews, by actors’ groups, including also the per-
ceptions of representatives of the regulating agencies, in order to highlight their potential di-
vergences of opinions and perceptions. The different aspects investigated are discussed in 
greater detail in the following sub-sections. 
5.2.1 Procedures and Effectiveness 
Local and MNC breeders had opposite opinions concerning the procedures needed to obtain 
PBR protection and the effectiveness of their protection. While MNC breeders positively con-
sidered the procedures, local breeders found the registration process cumbersome and costly, 
especially compared to its expected benefits. The time needed for obtaining protection was in 
general longer than the commercial life of the varieties, hence for these breeders the certifica-
tion costs rendered protection irrelevant. This discrepancy in the opinions could be related to 
the different resources, human and financial, allocated to PBR protection and to the expected 
profitability of the varieties. Public sector breeders had a negative perception of PBR protec-
tion. They believed it was not needed and that PBR had been implemented following interna-
tional pressures.  
Concerning the procedure to obtain patent protection, only two respondents were satisfied 
with it: It is worth mentioning that both had never applied for patent protection. Most private 
sector respondents were dissatisfied with the patent application procedures and thought that 
patents and trade secrets protection was not efficient in reality, due to corruption in the legal 
system and the general lack of knowledge prevailing among industry stakeholders. However, 
MNC breeders still believed that such tools were necessary and insisted on the importance of 
raising awareness and advocating IPR use among breeders. Public breeders expressed con-
cerns related to the relevance of protecting living organisms with IPR: They believed that 
patents and trade secrets were industrial tools, and that they should not be used for agricul-
tural innovations. 
From these perceptions one can conclude that the costs of the different transactions taking 
place between breeders and the IPR regulatory agencies impede the good functioning of the 
IP system. The lack of knowledge prevailing among breeders could be related to the informa-
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tion costs; the certification costs could, for the case of PBR, render protection irrelevant, 
while the enforcement is deficient, due to the flawed legal system and to corruption. 
Table 4: Perceptions of IPR impacts: Summary 
 
 
MNC 
(4) 
Local 
(11) 
Public 
(5) 
IP Regula-
tory Agen-
cies 
(3) 
Procedures and Effectiveness 
    
 
PBR 
Procedures for obtaining protection 
Effectiveness of protection 
 
 
+ 
- 
 
 
- 
+ 
 
 
? 
- 
 
 
n/a 
n/a 
Patents 
Procedures for obtaining protection 
Effectiveness of protection 
 
 - 
- 
 
- 
- 
 
? 
- 
 
n/a 
n/a 
Trade Secrets 
Effectiveness of protection 
 
? 
 
+ 
 
? 
 
n/a 
 
Incentives for R&D and Innovation 
    
PBR 
Patents 
Trade Secrets 
? 
+ 
0 
0 
+ 
? 
0 
0 
? 
? 
+ 
? 
Provide incentives for private investments? ? 0 + ? 
Provide incentives to international firms for local innova-
tions? 
+ 0 + ? 
 
Diffusion : Information and Germplasm Flows 
    
PBR 
Patents 
0 
- 
+ 
? 
- 
- 
? 
- 
Public-private information/ germplasm flows - - - + 
 
Market Structure and Prices 
    
Supporting private breeding + + + ? 
Seed Prices 0 0 + 0 
Concentration of the Industry 0 0 + ? 
Opinions on Policy Issues 
    
Plants should be patentable  + + - n/a 
In favour or UPOV Act of 1991 + - - n/a 
Legend (opinion of the majority): +: positive impact/in favor; - negative/against; 0: no impact; ?: do not know 
n/a. : not applicable 
Source: Interviews  
 
5.2.2 Incentives for R&D and Knowledge Creation 
Only a minority of breeders considered that IPR provided incentives for maize breeding ac-
tivities, while approximately half thought IPR had no influence. The same opinion prevailed 
concerning the impact of IPR on private investments, even though almost half of the breeders 
– including all MNC breeders – believed that IPR would be more important for foreign com-
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panies and could provide them with incentives to develop products adapted to the Mexican 
conditions. 
Local company breeders agreed in theory that patents would be useful and important in 
providing incentives for innovation, yet they believed that the current patent system definitely 
needed to become more efficient. Most breeders were not familiar with trade secrets and 
therefore could not evaluate their impact.  
As explained in section 4, a quantitative indicator of the impact of stronger IPR is the crea-
tion of new private breeding programs. Figure 4 shows that breeding programs from the sur-
veyed companies started at the beginning of the 1980s. The arrow indicates the occurrence of 
the first changes in IP laws, in 1991. The end of the 1980s indeed witnessed a high number of 
companies starting breeding programs. However, it is difficult to relate this change to the 
strengthening of IPR as several policy changes took place in 1991, namely a domestic agrar-
ian reform and the enactment of a new seed law removing the restriction to private sector par-
ticipation.  
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Figure 4: Number of Breeding Programs over Time  
Source: Interviews with maize breeders  
A second quantitative indicator is the number of breeders involved in maize breeding (see 
figure 5, presented by type of organization and level of education). The numbers increased 
between 1990 and 1999, for each type of organization. The number of highly educated breed-
ers also rose with time: while technicians were the most important group in 1990, MSc breed-
ers dominated in 1994 and 1999. This is probably related to the availability of educated 
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breeders: The interviewees mentioned this factor as limiting the development of the industry, 
and that the number of graduates had increased in the last years. Relaxing this constraint, 
rather than stronger IPR, might have contributed to an increase in the number of breeders in 
the industry. Finally, the information on R&D investments indicated that these had not in-
creased over time, but rather decreased in real terms: In the public sector, the budgets had 
stayed the same in nominal terms since 1985, even though the financial crisis of 1994-1995 
led to a severe devaluation of the Peso. Local companies affirmed they maintained a budget 
allowing to sustain a constant level of innovative activity, while MNC had seen their budgets 
reduced.  
 
Figure 5: Number of Breeders, by Sector and by Level of Education 
Source: Interviews with maize breeders. Note: Data not available for public sector for 1990 
The evidence gathered does not support the hypothesis that IPR provide incentives for 
innovation and R&D. Yet half of the breeders believed that stronger IPR would provide 
incentives to foreign enterprises for the performance of R&D adapted to Mexican needs, 
somehow in line with the fourth hypothesis. In general, transaction costs and corruption in the 
legal system affect the efficiency of the system: Several breeders thought that stronger IPR 
would, in theory, support innovation but that, in the Mexican institutional environment, they 
could not play their role. Ex ante information costs seem to be so high that the breeders have 
only little knowledge of IPR. Ex post, the importance of certification costs would render 
protection irrelevant, and the deficient enforcement, related to the corrupt and flawed legal 
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relevant, and the deficient enforcement, related to the corrupt and flawed legal system, would 
render protection inefficient in reality. Finally, quantitative indicators such as the number of 
breeding programs and the number of breeders cannot be related to the strengthening of IPR. 
Other policy changes, such as the enactment of the new seed law and the increased availabil-
ity of educated breeders, are much more likely to have had an impact.  
5.2.3 Diffusion: Information and Germplasm Flows 
Local breeders generally considered PBR to favour access to maize materials, while public 
breeders thought it would restrict their access and MNC breeders did not identify any impact. 
Even though none of the local companies had filed for PBR protection, some considered PBR 
more like a marketing device and as such, perceived it would facilitate the transfer of infor-
mation and diffusion of varieties, hence reduce information costs associated to transactions 
between breeders. Patents, on the other hand, were perceived by MNC and public breeders as 
potentially reducing their access to genetic materials and technologies, while most local 
breeders could not forecast the impact. 
According to the interviewees, the germplasm flows between public and private entities 
were not affected by the new IP laws, nor were international flows. It is worth mentioning that 
only the MNC were involved in international material transfers - from their headquarters – the 
other breeders were hence not speaking from experience. Quantitative data on germplasm 
flows and exchanges of varieties were not available, given the small number of transactions 
and their private character.  
The information gathered on the diffusion of germplasm reflects the different protection 
levels offered by the different types of IPR. On the one hand, PBR would facilitate the trans-
fer of information and varieties, while on the other hand, patents would reduce access to tech-
nology and germplasm. The lists of new varieties protected by PBR are probably more acces-
sible compared to the information concerning patented processes and products, and exemp-
tions exist for the use of protected varieties, which do not exist for patented inventions. Yet on 
basis of the little data on information and germplasm flows and technology transfer, it is im-
possible to determine the general impact of IPR on diffusion of information and materials. 
5.2.4 Market Structure and Prices  
A majority of respondents thought that private companies had become more important in the 
performance of breeding, especially MNC. These perceptions were especially strong for pub-
lic sector breeders, who also thought, contrary to private sector breeders, that IPR had con-
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tributed to increasing the concentration of the industry. A new seed law, enacted in 1991, al-
lowed complete participation of the private sector in the industry, making it difficult to distin-
guish the impact of stronger IPR in this new policy environment. Yet at the international level 
several mergers and takeovers have occurred between the companies of the “life science in-
dustry”, which also affected the number of companies operating in the Mexican market6 but 
was not related to the national strengthening of IPR. 
Public sector breeders believed that the strengthening of IPR had contributed to the in-
creases in seed prices over time. However, real seed prices, for both open pollinated and hy-
brid public varieties, stayed more or less constant over time (see figure 6). The prices of pri-
vate varieties were not available: breeders did not have the information and it is not compiled 
by the government. Even though public and private varieties are usually sold in different mar-
kets and therefore cannot be considered perfect substitutes, prices of public varieties still pro-
vide an indication of the evolution of seed prices during this period.  
Given the changes that occurred in the 90s in the country (e.g., policy reforms, exchange 
rate fluctuations) it might be difficult for the breeders to relate the phenomena to a given 
cause. Conversely, these changing conditions make evaluating the impact of a single policy 
change equally difficult. In the Mexican context, the industry in fact became less concentrated 
than it was, therefore the information gathered does not support hypothesis 3 that IPR would 
support the concentration of the industry and increases in seed prices. 
5.2.5 Breeders’ Opinions on Policy Issues 
The questions on policy issues allowed investigating hypothesis 4 - that IPR play different 
roles for diverse breeders’ groups and hence, that they have diverging perceptions of IPR. The 
issue of plant patents really separated the sectors: a strong majority (83%) of local private 
breeders and all MNC breeders, were in favour of patents on plants, while 72% of public sec-
tor breeders were against the idea. Patenting plant materials is allowed under the Industrial 
Property Law, but several public breeders thought it should be removed. 
In certain countries, seed industry stakeholders lobby the government to strengthen IP pro-
tection for plant varieties by adopting the UPOV Act of 19917. Conversely, most Mexican 
                   
6
  See Byerlee and Fischer (2000) for more information on mergers and acquisitions in the biotechnology 
industry. 
7
  The Act of 1991 goes beyond the scope of right foreseen by the Act of 1978 and brings the protection more 
into line with patent law (Leskien and Flitner 1997) by extending the length of protection and the number of 
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breeders did not know the difference between the two Acts, it is not an issue of concern in the 
industry. After a short summary of the two Acts’ characteristics, three out of the four MNC 
breeders considered the Act of 1991 as more appropriate for the country because of its longer 
length of protection and the stronger protection it grants (royalties for the use of essentially 
derived varieties, restrictions of Farmers’ privilege). Yet local breeders were in favour of the 
Act of 1978: 20 years of protection would be too long and the Act of 1978 would be more 
appropriate for small farmers. Likewise, public breeders considered that the Act of 1978 al-
lowed for more flexibility in policy design, which would be more suited to the Mexican real-
ity. This supports hypothesis 4: for plant patents, the discrepancy follows the line private 
against public sector, while for the UPOV Acts it goes along local organizations against mul-
tinational companies. On the other hand, the private-public divergence is probably related to 
the goals and missions of the organizations.  
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Figure 6: Evolution of Maize Seed Prices over Time 
Source:  PRONASE and SECOFI: Indicadores Económicos de Conyontura (2001). Data for 1993 and 1996 not 
available.   
The sharply differing opinions on these two issues reflect the diverging interests of the breed-
ers’ groups: the innovative firms, bringing inventions to the market, see the need for stronger 
IP protection in order to secure their markets and reap the benefits from their inventions. On 
the other hand, the followers put more emphasis on the diffusion of the information and hence 
want to keep the protection levels lower. This situation reflects to a certain extent the one pre-
  
species covered, restricting the farmers’ privilege to save seed and including the payment of royalties for 
essentially derived varieties. 
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vailing at the international level and the influence of the level of technological development 
on the use breeders make of IPR (see Chen and Puttitanun 2002). 
5.2.6 Regulatory Agencies 
The general level of knowledge among representatives of the regulatory agencies was rather 
low: each of them could answer almost exclusively the questions related to their type of IP 
protection. There was a general lack of communication between the different agencies, cou-
pled to a certain indifference for issues related to plant breeding from the part of the patent 
and trade secrets agencies. This can be explained by the relatively novel introduction of plants 
as protectable subject matters and the low level of patents and trade secrets in this area.  
The respondents were only partially satisfied with the real-life protection granted through 
patents. They mentioned red tape, high transaction costs and a lack of awareness concerning 
patents among the population as factors hindering patent protection. The enforcement of trade 
secrets was described as problematic, again due to stakeholders’ lack of knowledge and the 
high associated legal costs. As PBR had not been granted yet in the country, their real life 
efficiency was not discussed. The negative perceptions on enforcement measures and proce-
dures were however solely based on perceptions of the Mexican judiciary system, as no case 
for the infringement of patents, PBR nor trade secrets had been brought to court at the time of 
the study. These perceptions underline again the relevance of information, certification and 
enforcement costs for the efficiency of the IP system. However, no solution was envisaged to 
remedy this situation. 
Representatives from regulatory agencies believed that IPR would support innovation but 
did not relate them to the negative impacts discussed in the literature, such as reduction in 
diffusion and concentration of the industry. They acknowledged that IP protection systems 
needed to be adjusted to local characteristics in order to contribute to the economic develop-
ment of the country.  
6 Discussion  
6.1 Summary of the Results 
The results of this study do not support the general expectation that IPR would play a role for 
innovation in a technologically advanced developing country. The evidence gathered and the 
perceptions of the breeders do not support the hypotheses under study, except for the last one: 
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IPR do play different roles for the diverse actors’ groups. Table 5 summarizes the results of 
the study. 
 
Table 5: Summary of the Results 
 
Hypothesis Breeders’ perceptions Evidence 
1 IPR provide incentives 
for private R&D and 
innovation 
- IPR do not provide incentives for 
maize breeding 
- IPR do not support higher invest-
ments in R&D 
- Main user is a public organization 
- Evidence from number of breeding pro-
grams, number of breeders and R&D 
budgets not supportive 
- Other changes (e.g. policy, availability of 
educated breeders) might have had 
greater impact 
2 IPR restrict access to 
germplasm, new varie-
ties and inventions 
- No effect 
- PBR reduce transaction costs and 
favour access to maize materials 
- Patents reduce access to germ-
plasm and technologies 
- No evidence  
 
3 IPR foster the concen-
tration of the industry 
and an increase in seed 
prices 
- IPR favour MNC and private sec-
tor 
- IPR foster the concentration of the 
industry 
- IPR support increases in seed 
prices 
- Number of companies involved in  maize 
breeding increased 
- Prices stayed constant in real terms 
4 IPR play different roles 
for diverse breeders’ 
groups 
- IPR favour MNC 
- Public breeders: IPR on plant 
unethical 
- MNC believe IPR are necessary 
for the development of the indus-
try 
- MNC favour UPOV 1991, local 
breeders favour UPOV 1978 
- Only MNC possess patents  
- MNC second and third most important 
PBR owners 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
Hypothesis 1 is not supported by the evidence gathered: Breeders did not perceive stronger 
IPR as providing them with incentives for maize breeding, nor did they invest more in these 
activities due to their presence. The main user is a public institute, while IPR should provide 
incentives for private breeding, and data on R&D budgets and number of breeding programs 
and breeders did not offer strong support for this hypothesis.  
The agrarian reform and the introduction of the new seed law, along with the increased 
availability of educated breeders have played important roles in supporting breeding activi-
ties. It is difficult to identify the role IPR played since the industry underwent several reforms 
simultaneously. The respondents were also very critical of the procedures and enforcement of 
IPR: this lack of confidence helps to explain the low level of IPR use and the negative percep-
tions prevailing in the industry. Moreover, the little knowledge most breeders have of IPR 
reflects their minor role in their activities. Transaction costs in general, and more specifically 
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information, certification and enforcement costs play an important role: This is further dis-
cussed in the following section. 
Local breeders identified different impacts for PBR and patents: PBR reduce information 
costs in transactions between breeders while patents, on the other hand, reduce access to 
germplasm and technologies. The unavailability of data and the little experience the breeders 
have with transactions involving material and technology transfer did not allow identifying 
impacts and therefore supporting or rejecting hypothesis 2.  
The evidence gathered contradicts hypothesis 3 that IPR foster the concentration of the in-
dustry and support an increase in seed prices. The number of companies increased during the 
period under study, and the prices of public seed stayed constant over time, but given the 
number of policy changes in the 90s, it is difficult to identify the impact of IPR. The breeders 
perceived however the reality to be different: the inflation/devaluation of the peso in the 90s, 
the approval of private participation in the seed industry and the merger/acquisitions move-
ments at the international level might have influenced these perceptions, even though they are 
not related to the domestic strengthening of IPR.  
Finally, the only hypothesis supported by the results is that IPR play different roles for di-
verse breeders’ groups. This is first illustrated by the patterns of use: only MNC possess pat-
ents in the country, and along with INIFAP, MNC are the only users of PBR for maize. They 
also perceive their impacts differently and opinions diverge on issues such as the relevance of 
plant patents and PBR protection levels.  
The level of awareness of the breeders’ groups, their resource endowment but also their in-
terests and the products they develop are important explanatory factors. MNC breeders knew 
in general a lot more about IPR and their impacts and were more familiar with their use. 
These companies possess more human and financial resources and develop high-quality, 
modern products for bigger markets. IP protection can make economic sense for such compa-
nies and products. Indeed, IPR are only relevant for companies and breeders possessing in-
ventions worth protecting. They have an interest to protect this knowledge and reap all the 
benefits associated to it, while other breeders would prefer keeping the materials and tech-
nologies unprotected, and benefit from the knowledge spillovers. This reflects the situation at 
the international level that led to the implementation of the TRIPs Agreement. 
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6.2 Discussion 
The importance of IP protection has to be put in perspective: in most countries, viable maize 
breeding industries have existed before the presence of enforced IPR. They are hence not a 
necessary condition for the performance of maize breeding. Yet the case of maize is a special 
one since hybrid varieties have an “in-built” protection – and commercial breeding focuses 
almost only on hybrid varieties. However, similar results were obtained in studies looking at 
the impact of PBR on innovation for wheat, an open pollinated crop, in the United States 
(Alston and Venner 2002), and on all crops in Argentina (Jaffé and van Wijk 1995). Even 
though more empirical evidence would be needed before these results can be generalized to 
other countries and crops, the similitude for hybrid and open-pollinated crops and developing 
and industrialized countries are worth being noted. 
The relatively short time period between IPR strengthening in Mexico and the study also 
has to be taken into account. Plant breeding, and R&D in general, are long-term processes and 
the impacts of a new incentives scheme would probably take more time before it is identifi-
able. For this reason the emphasis was put on R&D input rather than output, as an indicator of 
higher innovative activity. 
Finally, the “real-world” effects of IPR are difficult to evaluate in the context of several 
simultaneous adjustments and policy changes. The low level of IPR use in the industry did not 
offer strong support to refine the theory and determine the dominating effects. The study 
however provides early evidence of the impacts of IPR in a technologically advanced devel-
oping country and finds that they do not play an important role. 
6.2.1 IPR and Development 
The low level of IPR use can also be related to the generally low innovative level prevailing 
in the industry. It is difficult for a country to produce inventions qualifying for patent protec-
tion when the level of technological development is relatively low. Developing countries’ 
preferred level of IP protection would follow a U-shaped curve with respect to its level of 
economic development (Maskus 2000; Chen and Puttitanun 2002). Countries like Mexico, 
who can benefit, in certain sectors, from imitating advanced technologies but cannot develop 
these yet, would benefit from weaker IPR. The optimal strength of protection would increase 
with technological development and the type of product developed. 
The link between IPR and the level of development was obvious during the Uruguay 
Round of negotiations, which led to the TRIPs agreement. IP protection was an issue of con-
24  Andréanne Léger 
cern for industrialized countries, i.e., technology exporters. Developing countries, on the other 
hand, knew they would lose from the inclusion of TRIPs in the WTO, but accepted in ex-
change for concessions in their areas of interest, namely agriculture and textiles (Watal 1999): 
The expected benefits have not yet been realized. Hence, IPR are still new tools that do not 
respond to needs expressed by the industry but had to be implemented to comply with 
NAFTA and WTO requirements. 
6.2.2 Transaction Costs and Institutional Environment 
On the other hand, transaction costs can sometimes be high enough to hamper the incentive 
effects. Comparing the effects of IPR and hybridisation on private plant breeding investments 
and innovation rate leads to this conclusion: the impact of IPR is not strongly supported by 
the data, whereas hybridisation’s role is (Léger 2001). The main difference between these two 
ways of appropriating returns from innovation is that hybridisation does not involve the trans-
action costs legal forms of protection are subject to. It also provides the same level of protec-
tion across countries, and therefore does not depend on the legal system in place. 
This last aspect also affects the efficiency of the system: Several breeders thought that 
stronger IPR would, in theory, support innovation but that, given the Mexican institutional 
environment, they could not play their role. This reveals the importance of the regulatory and 
institutional environments for the protection and enforcement of IPR and innovation, as sup-
ported by the empirical evidence of Alfranca and Huffman (2003). The representatives of the 
regulatory agencies admitted that there was a need for better coordination among agencies and 
greater efficiency in the procedures to obtain IP protection and enforce the rights.  
6.2.3 Implications 
The different transaction costs discussed have distinct impacts on the IP system, which de-
serve separate treatment. Information costs appear especially important, at least in two aspects 
relevant for the analysis: The difficulty to access information concerning IPR directly affects 
the level of IPR use, and hence the possibility to benefit from them. On the other hand, the 
lack of knowledge about IPR prevailing in the industry increases the difficulty of monitoring 
the use of the protected invention or variety, under the right holder’s responsibility, which in 
turn reduces the perceived efficiency of IPR. The low level of use can also be related to the 
certification costs, whose height can render protection irrelevant. 
The monitoring costs could be considered high given the low level of knowledge concern-
ing IPR prevailing in the industry. Several breeders however mentioned that the small size of 
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the industry, and the concentration of companies in the same region, lead to the informal 
monitoring of breeders’ activities and de facto reduce the need for PBR8. Breeders know each 
other and each others’ varieties: The unauthorised use is hence easy to detect and the associ-
ated costs very high in comparison with the potential benefits. Conversely, the enforcement 
costs, with IPR, can be important, and the defects and corruption of the legal system reduce 
the confidence breeders place in this organization, and further in IPR. 
These observations highlight the need for IPR regulatory agencies, if they want to increase 
the knowledge about and use of IPR, to reduce breeders’ information and certification costs. 
Finally, the informal monitoring system seems to function for maize varieties at this stage of 
development of the industry, but its expansion will eventually render this system obsolete, 
hence the need to reform the legal system. 
7 Conclusion 
There is little empirical evidence concerning the effects of intellectual property rights (IPR) 
on a technologically advanced developing country. Complete enumeration of the Mexican 
maize breeding industry showed that, contrary to the hypothesis that IPR would provide, in a 
technologically advanced developing country, incentives for R&D and innovation and stimu-
late diffusion of new knowledge and information, IPR play no role for the industry. This can 
be explained by the short time period between IPR strengthening and the study, but especially 
by the high information, certification and enforcement costs related to IP protection. 
From the results and discussion above, qualifications to IPR theory and policy can be for-
mulated for the case of developing countries. The all-positive assumptions at the basis of the 
TRIPs agreement (e.g., Article 7) should be put in perspective and characteristics of the coun-
tries should be taken into account in evaluating the role stronger IPR could play for their 
economy.  
The quality of the institutional environment, i.e., the agencies regulating and enforcing 
IPR, is an important aspect to take into account. The presence of efficient and reliable institu-
tions is key to the proper functioning of IPR and it is a weakness in several developing coun-
tries. In the same perspective, the costs of registration of the IPR, as well as the potential liti-
gation costs have to be bearable for the local inventors, in order for them to obtain added 
value from IP protection. 
                   
8
 Such informal monitoring system has not been observed for the case of patents. 
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Finally, the level of technological development prevailing in the country also has to be 
taken into account. When local inventors do not develop inventions qualifying for protection, 
the relevance of IP protection for the local industry can be questioned. Even though the coun-
tries benefit from protected products developed by MNC and brought into the country, this 
represents only one aspect of the potential benefits the countries could derive from IPR. 
Given the relatively good score of Mexico on these two critical factors, IPR are likely to play 
an even smaller role for other developing countries.  
References  
Alfranca, O. and W.E. Huffman. 2003. Aggregate Private R&D Investments in Agriculture: 
The Role of Incentives, Public Policies and Institutions. Economic Development and 
Cultural Change 52(1): 1-22. 
Alston, J.M., G.W. Norton and P.G. Pardey. 1995. Science under Scarcity: Principles and 
Practice for Agricultural Research Evaluation and Priority Setting. ISNAR and 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y. 
Alston, J.M. and R.J. Venner. 2002. The effects of the US Plant Variety Protection Act on 
wheat genetic improvement. Research Policy vol. 31(4): 527-542 
Byerlee, D. and K. Fischer. 2000. Accessing Modern Science: Policy and Institutional 
Options for Agricultural Biotechnology in Developing Countries. Paper presented at 
the 24th Conference of the International Agricultural Economics Association 
(IAAE), Berlin, Germany, August 14 -18, 2000. 
Chen, Y. and T. Puttitanun. 2002. Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation in Developing 
Countries. Paper presented at the conference “Innovation Policy in International 
Markets”, October 25-26, 2002, Berlin. 
Collier, P. 1998. The Role of the State in Economic Development: Cross-Regional 
Experiences. Journal of African Economies 7(0): 38-76. 
Commission on intellectual property rights [CIPR]. 2002. Integrating Intellectual Property 
Rights and Development Policy. Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights, London. 
Demsetz, H. 1967. Toward a Theory of Property Rights. American Economic Review 57(2): 
347-359. 
Gaisford, J. D., J. E. Hobbs, W. A. Kerr, N. Perdikis and M.D. Plunkett. 2001. The Economics 
of Biotechnology. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 
Jaffé, W. and J. Van Wijk. 1995. The Impacts of Plant Breeder’s Rights in Developing 
Countries: Debate and Experience in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and 
Uruguay. Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture and University of 
Amsterdam. 
Léger, Andréanne. 2001. Strengthening of Intellectual Property Rights in Mexico: Case Study 
of Maize Breeding. M.Sc. Thesis, Department of Development Economics, 
Wageningen University, The Netherlands. 
Intellectual Property Rigthts in Developing Countries 27 
 
Leskien, D. and M. Flitner. 1997. Intellectual Property Rights and Plant Genetic resources: 
Options for a Sui Generis System. Issues in Genetic Resources No. 6, June 1997. 
IPGRI, Rome, Italy. 
Lesser, William. 1998. Intellectual property rights and concentration in agricultural 
biotechnology. AgBioForum, 1(2), 56-61. http://www.agbioforum.org (28 July 2004) 
López Pereira, M.A. and M.P. Filippello. 1995. Emerging Roles of the Public and Private 
Sectors of the Maize Seed Industries in the Developing World. CIMMYT Economics 
Program Working Paper No. 95-01. Mexico, D.F.: CIMMYT.   
Maskus, Keith E. 2000. Intellectual property rights in the global economy. Institute for 
International Economics, Washington, D.C. 
Morris, M.L. and M.A. López Pereira. 1999. Impacts of Maize Breeding Research in Latin 
America, 1966-1997. Mexico, D.F.: CIMMYT. 
National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade [NLCIAFT]. 1997. Strong Intellectual 
Property Protection Benefits the Developing Countries. http://www.natlaw.com/ (28 
July 2004) 
North, D.C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Panagariya, A. 1999. TRIPs and the WTO: An Uneasy Marriage. Paper presented at the 
World Trade Organization, July 20th, 1999. 
Perrin, R.K. 1994. Intellectual Property Rights in Agricultural Development. In: Anderson, 
J.R. (Ed.) Agricultural Technology: Policy Issues for the International Community. 
CAB International, University Press, Cambridge. 
Tansey, G. 2004. Global Intellectual Property Rights: A New factor in Farming”. In: Ingco, 
M. and Nash, J.D., (eds.): Agriculture and the WTO: Creating a Trading System for 
Development. World Bank: Washington, DC, pp.255-270. 
Watal, J. 1999. Future Issues on IPRs at the WTO. Indian Council for Research on 
International Economic Relations, New Delhi, 17 p. 
World Trade Organization. 1995. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights. (28 July 2004). 
 
 Institutional Change in Agriculture and Natural Resources (ICAR) 
Discussion Papers 
Edited by Volker Beckmann and Konrad Hagedorn 
 
 
5/2005 Andréanne Léger: Intellectual Property Rights and their Impacts in Developing Coun-
tries An Empirical Analysis of Maize Breeding in Mexico, January 2005. 
4/2004 Jörg Eggers, Lutz Laschewski and Christian Schleyer: Agri-Environmental Policy in 
Germany. Understanding the Role of Regional Administration, December 2004 
3/2004 Annette Hurrelmann: Analysing Agricultural Land Markets as Organisations. An Em-
pirical Study in Poland, November 2004 
2/2004 Stefan Jungcurt: The Politics of Incoherence: A Framework for the Analysis of Func-
tional Overlap in International Governance as Two-Level Game, August 2004 
1/2003 Benedikt Korf: Conflict - Threat or Opportunity? War, Livelihoods, and Vulnerability in 
Sri Lanka, Oktober 2003.  
Published as Korf, Benedikt (2004) "War, Livelihoods and Vulnerability in Sri Lanka", 
Development and Change 35(2), 275-295  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 1613-3455 (Printausgabe) 
ISSN 1613-4862 (Internetausgabe) 
http://www.agrar.hu-berlin.de/wisola/fg/ress/icar 
